Abstract—An ad-hoc network is a multi-hop wireless network where all nodes cooperatively maintain network connectivity without a centralized infrastructure. If these nodes change their positions dynamically, it is called a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET). Since the network topology changes frequently, efficient adaptive routing protocols such as AODV, DSR, and TORA are used. As the network is wireless, security becomes the major issue in Mobile Ad hoc Networks. Some of the attacks such as modification, fabrication, impersonation and denial of service attacks are due to misbehavior of malicious nodes, which disrupts the transmission. To avoid such attacks some of the cryptographic algorithms and key management schemes and some existing security protocols are used. In this paper we represent a survey of performance based secure routing techniques in MANET. The security techniques are categorized based upon different approaches. The security type is borrowed from intrusion detection as either misuse detection or anomaly detection. This paper provides the major improvement in the secure techniques in MANET research using these approaches the features and categories in the surveyed work.

Keywords: MANET, Routing Protocol, Security.

I. INTRODUCTION

All communications in MANETs take place over the wireless medium. The wireless channels are open, shared and with relatively less power. First, due to the “open” nature of wireless medium, the wireless communication in MANETs is susceptible to eavesdropping that may lead to critical information leakage. The requirement of promiscuous mode is raised by many MANET protocols, i.e. continuous monitoring of the shared medium, further facilitates the practicality of eavesdropping. Additionally, wireless communications can be intercepted. Once capturing ongoing transmission, adversaries with sufficient knowledge of MANET protocols can meaningfully perform various malicious behaviours.

Some typical examples are: alter key information in packets, discard and/or forge messages, inject malicious messages, generate floods of spurious messages, and replay control and data traffic. Such misbehaviours have severe impact on MANETs. For example, MANET routing process requires all nodes dutifully participate in forwarding packets and provide valid routing information. Adversaries who perform either of above malicious behaviours can ruin the routing functionality [1] and [3].

By supportive infrastructure, we mean entities (or authorities) that perform administrative and management functionalities in MANETs. In a pure at MANET, there is no particular node that is designated as a central authority to execute administrative and management functionalities. Instead, all network operations, including security related control, are on the self-configuration base and in a decentralized way. Whether the security control (e.g., authentication and authorization) or not can be achieved heavily relies on the cooperation of network nodes. However, in the fully distributed and open environment of ad hoc networking, nodes trustworthy are fairly difficult to identify. This provides possible opportunities for misbehaving nodes to harm the security control operation. Meanwhile, the absence of administrative or domain boundaries make the enforcement of any security measures an even more complex problem. In this paper we discussed a survey of performance based secure routing protocol techniques in MANET.

II. BACKGROUND TECHNIQUES

MANET Security

The theory and experiences have indicated that, due to its unique characteristics, MANETs are suffering from a wide range of security threats and attacks, not only the same attacks their infrastructure counterpart are facing, but also new ones particularly targeting MANETs.

Unsecured Wireless Channel

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raised by many MANET protocols, i.e. continuous monitoring of the shared medium, further facilitates the practicality of eavesdropping. Additionally, wireless transmissions can be intercepted. Once capturing ongoing transmission, adversaries with sufficient knowledge of MANET protocols can meaningfully perform various malicious behaviours. Some typical examples are: alter key information in packets, discard and/or forge messages, inject malicious messages, generate floods of spurious messages, and replay control and data traffic. Such misbehaviours have severe impact on MANETs. For example, MANET routing process requires all nodes dutifully participate in forwarding packets and provide valid routing information. Adversaries who perform either of above malicious behaviours can ruin the routing functionality [1] and [2].

**Dynamic Mobility**

In MANETs, freely roaming nodes join and leave the network independently, possibly frequently, and without notice. This dynamic mobility raises several challenges. First, the network topology is constantly changing. More importantly, the mobility makes it difficult in most cases to have a clear picture of the membership. Trust relationship among mobile nodes cannot be assumed to be held in all time, which may lead security solutions with static configuration not to produce expected results. Secondly, the network mobility also makes it difficult to classify nodes as internal nodes or external nodes, which can be easily achieved in traditional infrastructure networks. The classification of internal and external nodes (that is, nodes that belong to the network or not) is important for establishing a line of defence, such as authentication and authorization. Assisted by the absence of trust relationship and classification facilities, adversaries can easily infiltrate MANETs and launch various attacks from inside.

**Absence of Central Supportive Infrastructure**

By supportive infrastructure, we mean entities (or authorities) that perform administrative and management functionalities in MANETs. In a pure at MANET, there is no particular node that is designated as a central authority to execute administrative and management functionalities. Instead, all network operations, including security related control, are on the self-configuration base and in a decentralized way. Whether the security control (e.g., authentication and authorization) or not can be achieved heavily relies on the cooperation of network nodes. However, in the fully distributed and open environment of ad hoc networking, nodes trustworthy are fairly difficult to identify. This provides possible opportunities for misbehaving nodes to harm the security control operation. Meanwhile, the absence of administrative or domain boundaries make the enforcement of any security measures an even more complex problem. For example, because mobile nodes move through different network areas and become associated with different domains, it may be difficult to establish the trust associations of nodes. In turn, MANETs may lack the ground for the establishment of some type of a secret (or keys), so that cryptographic mechanisms can be employed [4] and [6].

**Limited Resources**

In order to be light and portable, mobile wireless devices in MANETs cannot be equipped with many resources, such as memory, battery and CPU capacity. The lack of sufficient resources could result in several security risks. First of all, limited computational capabilities of mobile nodes cannot support complicated cryptographic operations, especially if they have to be performed for each packet and over each link of the traversed path. Secondly, mobile nodes have less physical protection, and therefore are easily stolen, captured and compromised. In many cases, adversaries exploit the compromised nodes to launch the attack. In addition, node's transmission power is typically limited. An adversary with sufficient transmission power and knowledge of the physical and medium access control (MAC) layer mechanisms can obstruct its neighbours from gaining access to the wireless medium. More importantly, mobile devices could become ideal targets of DoS attacks due to their limited computational capability, memory and battery. An adversary could generate bogus packets, forcing the victim to consume a substantial portion of its resources. Even worse, a malicious node with valid credentials could frequently generate control traffic, such as route queries, at a high rate not only to consume bandwidth, but also to impose cumbersome cryptographic operations on a network node [5] and [7].

**Routing Attacks in MANET**

Routing protocols (Network layer protocols) extend connectivity from neighbouring 1-hops nodes to all other nodes in MANET. The connectivity between mobile hosts over a potentially multi-hop wireless link strongly relies on cooperative reactions among all network nodes. A variety of attacks targeting the network layer have been identified and heavily studied in research papers. By attacking the routing protocols, attackers can absorb network traffic; inject themselves into the path between the source and destination, and thus control the network traffic flow, as shown in Figure 1 (a) and (b), where a malicious node M can inject itself into the routing path between sender S and receiver D.
The traffic packets could be forwarded to a non-optimal path, which could introduce significant delay. In addition, the packets could be forwarded to a non-existent path and get lost. The attackers can create routing loops, introduce severe network congestion, and channel contention into certain areas. Multiple colluding attackers may even prevent a source node from finding any route to the destination, causing the network to partition, which triggers excessive network control traffic, and further intensifies network congestion and performance degradation.

Attacks at the routing discovery phase

There are malicious routing attacks that target the routing discovery or maintenance phase by not following the specifications of the routing protocols. Routing message flooding attacks, such as hello flooding, RREQ flooding, acknowledgement flooding, routing table overflow, routing cache poisoning, and routing loop are simple examples of routing attacks targeting the route discovery phase. Proactive routing algorithms, such as DSDV and OLSR, attempt to discover routing information before it is needed, while reactive algorithms, such as DSR and AODV, create routes only when they are needed. Thus, proactive algorithms are more vulnerable to routing table overflow attacks. Some of these attacks are listed below.

Routing table overflow attack: A malicious node advertises routes that go to non-existent nodes in the network. It usually happens in proactive routing algorithms, which update routing information periodically. The attacker tries to create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created. The proactive routing algorithms are more vulnerable to table overflow attacks because proactive routing algorithms attempt to discover routing information before it is actually needed. An attacker can simply send excessive route advertisements to overflow the victim’s routing table.

Routing cache poisoning attack: In route cache poisoning attacks, attackers take advantage of the promiscuous mode of routing table updating, where a node overhearing any packet may add the routing information contained in that packet header to its own route cache, even if that node is not on the path. Suppose a malicious node M wants to poison routes to node X. M could broadcast spoofed packets with source route to X via M itself; thus, neighbouring nodes that overhear the packet may add the route to their route caches.

Attacks at the routing maintenance phase

There are attacks that target the route maintenance phase by broadcasting false control messages, such as link-broken error messages, which cause the invocation of the costly route maintenance or repairing operation. For example, AODV and DSR implement path maintenance procedures to recover broken paths when nodes move. If the destination node or an intermediate node along an active path moves, the upstream node of the broken link broadcasts a route error message to all active upstream neighbours. The node also invalidates the route for this destination in its routing table. Attackers could take advantage of this mechanism to launch attacks by sending false route error messages.

Attacks at data forwarding phase

Some attacks also target data packet forwarding functionality in the network layer. In this scenario the malicious nodes participate cooperatively in the routing protocol routing discovery and maintenance phases, but in the data forwarding phase they do not forward data packets consistently according to the routing table. Malicious nodes simply drop data packets quietly, modify data content, replay, or flood data packets; they can also delay forwarding time-sensitive data packets selectively or inject junk packets.

Wormhole attack:

Fig 1 Illustration of Routing Attack
An attacker records packets at one location in the network and tunnels them to another location. Routing can be disrupted when routing control messages are tunnelled. This tunnel between two colluding attackers is referred to as a wormhole. Wormhole attacks are severe threats to MANET routing protocols. For example, when a wormhole attack is used against an on-demand routing protocol such as DSR or AODV, the attack could prevent the discovery of any routes other than through the wormhole.

Attacks on particular routing protocols

There are attacks that target some particular routing protocols. In DSR, the attacker may modify the source route listed in the RREQ or RREP packets. It can delete a node from the list, switch the order, or append a new node into the list. In AODV, the attacker may advertise a route with a smaller distance metric than the actual distance, or advertise a routing update with a large sequence number and invalidate all routing updates from other nodes [1-3] and [6-8].

III. SURVEY OF SECURE ROUTING TECHNIQUES

Trust Based Secure Routing in AODV Routing Protocol

A perfect trust model in the network layer, and established secure route between source and destination without any intruders or malicious nodes. In this paper, existing AODV routing protocol has been modified in order to adapt the trust based communication feature. Proposed trust based routing protocol is equally concentrates both in node trust and route trust. In this proposed model, route trust plays an equal role with node trust. Using trust value, secure route can be established in the MANET. Here, network security enhancement is completely performed in the line light of trust value. In the dynamic environment, node can change its characteristics at any time. After successful participation in the route establishment process, the neighbor may behave like as a malicious node. To avoid this, route trust process (one of the process in the modified protocol) continuously monitor the active routes and calculate the current route trust value or the status of the route. But most of the previous works have been concentrated only in the node trust for establishing communication. This paper explains three main operations; Node trust calculation, Route trust calculation and Trust based route establishment and route monitoring process.

This model requires some adequate changes in the existing source initiated routing protocol, AODV. Modified AODV routing protocol establishes route among nodes based on the trust value.

Node Trust Calculation Process:

Various methods have been proposed for calculating node’s trustworthiness. Different trust metrics have been evaluated to identify the trust level of node. Each node has opinion about other node’s (neighbor) trustworthiness. Node X has an opinion about trustworthiness of one of its neighbor node Y based on Y’s previous and current behaviors. a new data structure Neighbor is introduced in each node of the MANET. All the nodes in such environment already maintain Routing Table. Additionally added Neighbor Table should be maintaining in all the nodes for keep tracks the dynamically changing neighbor list and its corresponding node trust value. Trust computation involves the process of assigning weights (utility/importance factor) to the events that they can monitor and quantified. Weight assignment process depends on the type of application demanding the trust level. Nodes are dynamically assigning these weights based on their own criteria and circumstances. These weights have a continuous range from 0 to +1 representing the significance of a particular event from unimportant to most important. The trust values for all the events of a node can be combined using individual weights to determine the aggregate trust level for another node.

Route Trust Calculation Process:

Route trust is computed by every node for each route in its routing table. Modified extended Routing supports Route Trust calculation process. Existing Routing Table extended with one more field; Route Trust. In this approach, source node selects the route which is having the highest Route Trust value. Route Trust field of every Routing Table entry is updated at some regular interval. In this method, only one additional field is enough to monitor the route trust worthiness. The proposed approach is the extension of existing AODV routing protocol for creating secure route for communication. Proposed modifications are in acceptable limit. With this minimum overhead, we can easily eliminate the malicious node as well as they can establish a best trusted route between source and destination. Also it creates a secure communication in this environment without any internal attackers. Using simulation results, the performance of this protocol is not sufficient justified. In the future, it will be incorporate with other MANET routing protocols [1].
DAAODV: A Secure Ad-hoc Routing Protocol based on Direct Anonymous Attestation

Wenchao Huang, Yan Xiong, Depin Chen et. al. proposed a novel secure routing protocol DAAODV which is based on Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing (AODV). DAAODV takes full advantage of trusted computing technology, particularly the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) and Property-based Attestation (PBA) protocols. DAAODV is an anonymous protocol without requirement of Trusted Third Party (TTP). Moreover, we propose an efficient signing and verification scheme to overcome the potential DoS attacks triggered by the low efficiency of DAA and PBA. In the simulation, the results show that DAAODV is still efficient in discovering secure routes compared with AODV protocol. In this paper, based on AODV and proposed a novel secure ad hoc routing protocol DAAODV which is anonymous and avoids TTP, and prevents from malicious nodes and selfish nodes. The basic idea is to use Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) to accomplish full anonymity in the routing protocol and use issuer instead of TTP, and to use property based attestation (PBA) to guarantee that only nodes whose platform is trusted can join the group. The main challenge of implementing this protocol is the cost of DAA and PBA protocol is a little high, so we choose an efficient DAA protocol and propose a new light-weighted signing and verifying protocol to ease the problem. Experiments proves that it is still very efficient compared with AODV protocol.

DAAODV presents almost a fully protection of routing process and it can be more easily analysed than other protocols for the hosts that could participate in the routing protocol have to run in an anticipated way. The main extra cost of DAAODV via AODV is the establishment of secure link which uses DAA and PBA protocols. The DAA adopted in this paper is very efficient in DAA Sign and DAA Verify though not efficient in join protocols. However, hosts have already got the certificate in join protocol before deployed, which means only the cost of DAA Sign and DAA Verify are considered in our protocol. Meanwhile, hosts with the certificate could make DAA Sign which means the bottleneck TTP is no longer needed in the protocol. Additionally, hello messages should be broadcasted after a few seconds for controlling the CHV, which increases the time interval of establishment of secure link. However, only the processes of establishment cost an extra time, and other messages are handled efficiently for they are encrypted by symmetric keys between hosts. They presented a secure ad-hoc routing protocol which can prevent most attacks including worm-hole attacks, vertex cut attacks, and traffic analysis attacks, and adopt a new efficient signing and verifying scheme preventing DoS attacks. This protocol doesn’t use TTP, and doesn’t add much overhead in ns-2 simulation. In future work is to make a fine-grained construction of the routing software, as the design of DAAODV on software level is a little coarse-grained. For example, we should make a concrete scheme of operating the PCRs, and should prove that the DAAODV can avoid attacks at the software level [2].

AODVsec: A Multipath Routing Protocol in Ad- Hoc Networks for Improving Security

Cuirong Wang, Shuxin Cai et. al. proposed a secure routing protocol based on multipath routing technology, namely AODVsec, which divides a data unit into several data pieces and transmits these pieces through different paths. By setting security level on each node, AODVsec limits the maximum number of data pieces an intermediate node can forward. In this way, the malicious node cannot get enough data information for breaking the encryption algorithm. Simulation results show that AODVsec improves security with negligible routing overhead by comparison of the traditional multipath AODV routing protocols.

Design and Implementation of AODVsec:

In AODVsec, each node is set a trust level to limit the maximum data piece number that can be transmitted through. Multiple paths are generated from the source to the destination, and the path information is stored in source node’s routing table. Before sending each data unit at the source node, each data unit is split into several pieces. AODVsec assigns a data piece to a safer path selected from the local routing table.

Reverse path: Different from traditional AODV, AODVsec does not look up from the broadcast list when generating the reverse path. The routing table’s update time should follow the three following principles. To establish connection to the destination node, the source node broadcasts a request PREQ. On the receipt of source’s PREQ at the first time, the intermediate node inserts a reverse path to the local broadcast list. When it receives sources PREQ from other path, it stops looking up local broadcast list and adds another reverse path. Only the following three conditions satisfy, update the routing table

- If there is no route to the source in the routing table, AODVsec adds this new route to the routing table.
- If the number of the routing paths to the source has not hit the maximum number, which should be set according to practical requirements and node number, AODVsec adds this new route to the routing table.
- If there is a route update request which transmits through less hops, even the routing path number hits the maximum limit, AODVsec updates routing table by adding this new routing path.

Forward path: In AODV protocol, before sending back the response packet RREP, the node looks up the reverse path existed in the routing table, through which RREP is sent back, and finally the forward path is generated. While in AODVsec, if we query routing table to choose the reverse path based on AODV’s mechanism, we will get the same
result on every attempt of query. In this way, they generate a single forward path. When a node sends RREP, AODVsec uses the new route query function for choosing the particular reverse path with least sent RREP message. Thus, all the reverse paths would be used as round robin, and multiple forward paths could be established.

The infrastructure less and dynamic nature of MANET demands new set of networking analysis in order to provide diverse application in many different scenarios. So, it is possible that some application demands less overhead as well as fast processing with efficient transmission. This paper, presents the protocol being proposed which utilizes the dual cooperative mobile agents and stationary agents for routing in dynamic networks as MANET. Every mobile agent computes the transmission capacity of all the nodes so that Routing Agent System (RAS) can take the efficient reliable decision which routing path is more efficient and reliable. Each node has its own stationary agents but number of mobile agents in the network depends on the network architecture or the protocol used.

The transmission capacity factor into the networking as MANET of the protocol will need to improve in future [6].

**Surveying different techniques we define the Advantages and Disadvantages of techniques in the table:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Techniques</th>
<th>Advantages/ Merits</th>
<th>Disadvantages/Future Improvement</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANET, AODV, Trusted Networks; Trust Model</td>
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<td>Using simulation results, the performance of this protocol is not sufficient justified. In the future, it will be incorporate with other MANET routing protocols [1].</td>
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<td>The results show that AODVsec outperforms traditional multipath routing on ensuring security. As a common case, attacker cannot intercept all the paths, AODVsec avoids maliciously accessing an entire data packet, so it improves system’s security with negligible routing overhead.</td>
<td>The AODVsec still has some imperfect points. As a future work, it will need to focus on designing the synchronization control Mechanism to solve this problem [3].</td>
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<td>lessSecuirty1.; MANE, IEEE 802.11b4</td>
<td>The efficient security algorithm ES-AODV enhances the security in ad hoc wireless networks. According to the analysis of the results obtained from extensive simulation, it concludes that the secure routing solution scales well to both mobility and network size.</td>
<td>The routing protocol performs Does not better than the existing secure AODV routing protocol with increased mobility in the network. It should be improve in future extension [4].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANET, Routing, Security</td>
<td>In the implementation of such routing protocols, the need is to eliminate the shortcoming of these protocols by evaluating performance of them on a simulation platform. To minimize the associated overhead like delay, routing overhead demands an intensive optimization in both the protocols.</td>
<td>In future it will require more specifically SAODV to decrease the processing requirements to tackle hash chains and digital signatures to implement the security [5].</td>
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</table>

CONCLUSION

A MANET (Mobile Ad-hoc Network) is an autonomous collection of mobile users that offers infrastructure-free communication over a shared wireless medium. It is formed spontaneously without any preplanning. Multicasting is a fundamental communication paradigm for group oriented communications such as video conferencing, discussion forums, frequent stock updates, and video on demand, view programs, and advertising. The combination of an ad hoc environment with multicast services induces new challenges towards the security infrastructure in routing protocols. In order to secure multicast communication, security services such as authentication, data integrity, and access control and group confidentiality are required. Among which group confidentiality is the most important service for several applications. These security services can be facilitated if group members share a common secret. During the survey on secure routing protocols in MANET, we conclude some points that can be further explored in the future using advanced secure technique and it will improve the performance of secure MANET to achieve more efficient accuracy in network congestion, reduce the end to end delay time, overhead and throughput.

REFERENCES


